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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the commencement of state activities in outer space with the “space 
race” in the late 1950s and 1960s between the United States and the former 
Soviet Union,1 a need has developed for a unique framework through which 
actors can resolve conflicts revolving around outer space activities.  This 
development emerged predominantly in the 1990s and 2000s due to 
advancing technology, addition of parties engaging in space activities, and 
commercialization of outer space.2  In response to the perceived void in outer 
space activity dispute resolution,3 on December 6, 2011, the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) adopted the Optional Rules for the Arbitration of 
Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities (Outer Space Rules).4  While the 
Outer Space Rules are based on the commonly-used 2010 United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL), 
they are modified to cater to the unique aspects of disputes that contain outer 
space elements.5  Such disputes can stem from outer space pursuits by states, 
international organizations, and private entities.6  
In recent decades, commercial uses of outer space in the areas of satellite 
communications, launching facilities, and remote sensing have largely 
accounted for a substantial increase in space traffic.7  The diversity and 
number of actors engaged in outer space activities have also increased.8  
Given these changes, it seems likely that in the future more disputes related 
to outer space conduct will arise among not only state actors, but also private 
parties, national and multinational corporations, and international 
organizations.  Moreover, with the concept of space tourism entering the 
scene, private individuals will potentially have space-related conflicts.9  
Combining the above factors with key space activity considerations like the 
extreme expenses, the complex technology required, and the consequent 
                                                                                                                   
 1 The Space Race, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/space-race (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2014). 
 2 Michael Listner, A New Paradigm for Arbitrating Disputes in Outer Space, THE SPACE 
REVIEW: ESSAYS AND COMMENTARY ABOUT THE FINAL FRONTIER (Jan. 09, 2012), http://www. 
thespacereview.com/article/2002/1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm, 51st Sess., Mar. 19–30, 
2012, U.N. DOC. A/AC.105/C.2/2012/CRP.17 (Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Outer Space Rules]. 
 5 Alison Ross, A Giant Leap for Arbitration?, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Dec. 14, 2011. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Fausto Pocar, An Introduction to the PCA’s Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes 
Relating to Outer Space Activities, 38 J. SPACE L. 171, 174 (2012). 
 8 Id. at 175. 
 9 Id. 
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necessity of international cooperation, disputes are certain to pop up on the 
international stage.10  
This Note analyzes how outer space activities have evolved from the 
1950s to present-day conduct.  Part II discusses problems with current 
controlling space laws and introduces the Outer Space Rules.  Part III 
examines why the Outer Space Rules provide an effective means for space 
activity dispute resolution and how they fill the current void in this area, 
given the changes in recent decades. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Beginning of Outer Space Activity: Technology and Players 
Following World War II, as the United States and the Soviet Union 
emerged as world superpowers, each became suspicious of the other.11  This 
period of hostility and espionage between the two countries, known as the 
Cold War, ultimately helped spur the space race.12  In an effort to gather 
intelligence on the Soviet Union, and after the Soviet Union refused to accept 
President Eisenhower’s proposed “Open Skies” policy permitting each 
nation to fly reconnaissance aircraft over the other, Eisenhower announced 
on July 29, 1955, that the United States would commence work to launch a 
satellite.13  Instantly, the Soviet Union announced the same.14 
The Soviet Union launched a satellite called Sputnik 1, representing the 
first unmanned mission into space, on October 4, 1957.15  Next, they 
launched Sputnik, which carried a dog, on November 3, 1957.16  The space 
race era produced a great amount of space exploration, as each country 
sought to outstrip the other in progress and technology.17  The two countries 
made great strides in space exploration and the first manned mission was 
achieved by the Soviet Union on April 12, 1961.18  The space race 
culminated with the United States, working through its National Aeronautics 
                                                                                                                   
 10 Id. 
 11 Space Race Time Line, PBS NOVA, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/astrospies/time-nf. 
html (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 The History of Space Exploration, ONLINE STAR REGISTER, http://osr.org/en-us/articles/ 
the-history-of-space-exploration/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Space Race Time Line, supra note 11.  
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Space Administration (NASA), successfully launching the manned Apollo 
11 mission, making the first safe manned landing on the moon on July 20, 
1969.19 
B.  The Modern-Day Space Picture 
While outer space activities were originally the exclusive territory of 
governments—mainly the United States and Soviet Union—the space club 
membership has since expanded to more than thirty nations, most notably 
including China, France, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and India.20  In 
addition, private space enterprises have sprouted up in recent years, engaging 
in everything from scientific experiments to space tourism.21 
With this expansion of state involvement in outer space activities, 
scientific development and cooperation between international space 
organizations and states has also grown.  A prominent example of this 
includes the International Space Station (ISS).  Earlier projects include a 
1975 European Space Agency (ESA) mission to examine the foundations of 
extra-terrestrial gamma radiation at energies above 30 MeV, and an ESA-
NASA-U.K. 1978 mission to study ultraviolet light from the stars along with 
storm signals of cosmic upheavals.22  Additional examples include a 1989 
Japanese-Canadian cooperation to study auroral phenomena, and a 1998 
cooperative mission between Japan, the United States, Canada, Sweden, and 
Germany to study Martian plasma.23  These illustrations show how critical 
international cooperation is to scientific missions to space and that space-
related disputes require a settlement mechanism that is equipped to deal with 
this highly specialized, technologically complex, and evolving area of 
activity involving diverse actors. 
                                                                                                                   
 19 The History of Space Exploration, supra note 15. 
 20 GERARDINE MEISHAN GOH, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: A 
MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE FOR OUTER SPACE 164 (2007); Chia-Jui Cheng, International 
Arbitration System as a Mechanism for the Settlement of Disputes Arising in Relation to Space 
Commercialization, 5 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 165, 165 (2001).  
 21 See, e.g., Jennifer Polland, How the Private Sector Revolutionized the Space Race in a 
Few Short Years, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-
private-sector-revolutionized-the-space-race-in-a-few-short-years-2012-8 (describing private 
efforts at space exploration). 
 22 GOH, supra note 20, at 153. 
 23 Id. at 153–54. 
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As of 2013, “the global space economy” was valued at $314.17 billion.24  
The commercial sector comprised 76% of that number, with approximately 
$116.24 billion allocated to commercial infrastructure and support industries, 
and $122.53 billion allocated to commercial space products and services, 
such as services provided by satellites.25  World government spending 
accounted for a mere 24% of the global space economy, ringing in at about 
$75.4 billion.26  Because of the large monetary value of space activities, 
private actors are getting involved in space pursuits.  Partly spurring this 
increased participation by private actors and commercialization of space is a 
movement by governments to operate their space programs on a commercial 
basis by providing launch services, satellite communications, and other 
market-oriented commercial services.27  In addition, private actors now have 
the opportunity to participate in space activity areas that require less 
governmental responsibility, as shown by the commercialization of 
telecommunications, remote sensing, and ground-based satellite operation 
systems.28  
1.  Commercialization of Outer Space 
Until the early 1980s, the launching of space vehicles and satellites into 
outer space was solely carried out under governmental sponsorships, 
including those launches seeking to place commercially owned and operated 
communications satellites into orbit.29  Arianespace Corporation, a French 
hybrid public-private corporation with ties to the French space agency, was 
the first company to launch satellites for commercial customers and began 
operations in 1982.30  U.S. launch vehicles, or carrier rockets, such as Delta 
and Atlas, began to pursue commercial customers in competition with 
Arianespace in the late 1980s.31  By 1983, the Soviet Union was seeking 
commercial customers through Glavkosmos, a marketing organization, and 
                                                                                                                   
 24 Marcia S. Smith, Space Foundation: Space Economy Grew by 4 Percent in 2013, SPACE 
POLICY ONLINE (May 19, 2014, 9:36 PM), http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/space-fou 
ndation-space-economy-grew-by-4-percent-in-2013.  
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 GOH, supra note 20, at 159. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Commercial Launch Industry, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EB 
checked/topic/332323/launch-vehicle/272750/Commercial-launch-industry (last visited Apr. 16, 
2014). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
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China was doing the same by 1985 with its Chang Zheng family of launchers 
marketed by the China Great Wall Industry Corporation.32  Japan, India, and 
other nations have since followed suit as well.33 
But the global expansion of commercial communications companies 
created a market demand for commercially provided satellite launch services, 
and those wishing to launch communications satellites had the motivation to 
invest millions of dollars to accomplish this.34  When stringent government 
controls on commercial space activities were relaxed in the 1990s, national and 
multinational companies began to join in commercial use of outer space.35  By 
1996, global commercial utilization, development, manufacturing, and 
operation of space hardware and infrastructure activities represented 53% of 
all outer space expenditures.36  By 2013 this figure had increased to 76%.37  
The increase in private space companies has necessitated the expansion of 
international space law to cover the activities not only of states and 
international organizations, but also of these private enterprises.38  The main 
concern here is that some partnerships have been established between the 
public and private sectors to engage in space activities, complicating the 
application of public international law in the area of outer space disputes.39  
The foundational principles of societal and public use of outer space must be 
balanced with these valid private interests.40 
2.  Private Entities Engaged in Space Activities 
Numerous private corporations have plans, and indeed the technology 
may be feasible in the near future, to mine asteroids in outer space for 
precious metals, such as gold, platinum, and rhodium.41  For example, a 
Seattle-based company, Planetary Resources, claims that within the next ten 
years it plans to mine “near Earth asteroids,” a proposal that will cost billions 
of dollars.42  Its investors include Google’s Eric Schmidt and Larry Page and 
                                                                                                                   
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Cheng, supra note 20, at 165–66. 
 36 GOH, supra note 20, at 159; Smith, supra note 24. 
 37 GOH, supra note 20, at 159; Smith, supra note 24. 
 38 Cheng, supra note 20, at 166. 
 39 GOH, supra note 20, at 158. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Charles Arthur, Google Pair Back Plan to Lasso Asteroids and Mine them for Precious 
Metals, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2012, 2:21 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/ 
apr/24/mining-asteroids-on-moon-precious-metals?INTCMP=SRCH. 
 42 Id.  
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former U.S. presidential candidate Ross Perot.  Additionally, in some cases 
private corporations are taking over from governments the provision of space 
shuttles to taxi astronauts into space.  For example, NASA recently selected 
three aerospace companies to which it plans to give more than $1.1 billion 
for the creation of small rocket ships to transport astronauts to the ISS.43  
This effectively invited private corporations “to take over the job of the now-
retired [NASA] space shuttle.”44 
3.  Satellite Use 
The list of social and private benefits provided by the nearly 1,000 active 
satellites in orbit as of April 1, 2012, includes better-quality disaster warning 
and response, consistent global communications and navigation, and 
heightened national and international security.45  One example of the trend 
toward increased commercialization and privatization of satellites is 
illustrated by recent actions in Japan.  In September 2012, the Japanese space 
agency, JAXA, announced that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) had taken 
over responsibility from the Japanese government for all launches of Japan’s 
H-2B rocket, which is used for activities such as placing unmanned cargo 
freighters into orbit for supply runs to the ISS.46  This privatization move 
allows for lower production and operating costs, which permits Japan to 
become a bigger player in the global commercial launch market.47 
4.  Space Tourism Industry 
Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen and American aerospace engineer Burt 
Rutan funded the suborbital air-launched spaceplane, SpaceShipOne, which 
                                                                                                                   
 43 Seth Borenstein, NASA Picks Three Private Firms to Develop Space Taxis, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 3, 2012, 2:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/03/space-taxis_n_173 
8126.html. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Brian Weeden, The Economics of Space Sustainability, SPACE REVIEW: ESSAYS AND 
COMMENTARY ABOUT THE FINAL FRONTIER (June 4, 2012), http://www.thespacereview.com/arti 
cle/2093/1; UCS Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/ 
nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database. 
html. 
 46 Peter B. de Selding, Mitsubishi Taking Over H-2B Launch Operations, SPACENEWS 
(Sept. 23, 2012), http://www.spacenews.com/article/mitsubishi-taking-over-h-2b-launch-oper 
ations. 
 47 Id. 
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gave rise to the first private space travel.48  Following this foray, Richard 
Branson founded Virgin Galactic, the world’s first commercial space tourism 
company.49  Additionally, since 1998, Space Adventures, a Virginia-based 
company with an office in Moskow, uses a Russian Soyuz spacecraft and 
works with wealthy individuals who wish to travel to outer space as 
tourists.50  Space Adventures successfully launched five people into outer 
space to MIR, Russia’s former space station, which is no longer in orbit, and 
more recently to the ISS.51  Considering the surge in space tourism, private 
parties will likely need an international forum in which to resolve dispute 
claims.  More trips are already being booked by various companies.52  Virgin 
Galactic claims to have more than 500 to-be space-farers presently signed up 
for its space tourism ventures, including celebrities like Tom Hanks and 
Angelina Jolie.53  Whether it is a short two hour flight for $200,000 with 
Virgin Galactic, a trip from Russia to the ISS for $20 million, or a longer 
voyage for upwards of $150 million for a stay at a “gravity-neutral point” 
near the moon, space tourism is now an actuality.54   
One important complication to private space activities is that these private 
parties may be of different nationalities than that of the corporation they 
contract with to launch into space.  With such extensive sums of money on 
the line, a forum for resolution of disputes that can accommodate the overlap 
between nationalities and public and private law is imperative. 
C.  Dispute Resolution in Space Law 
A major issue resulting from the commercialization and expansion of 
outer space activities and the increasing number of space actors is that of the 
                                                                                                                   
 48 Mandy de Waal, Outer Space: The Filthy Frontier, DAILY MAVERICK (May 4, 2012), 
http://dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-05-04-outer-space-the-filthy-frontier.  
 49 Id. 
 50 Christopher M. Hearsey, A Review of Challenges to Corporate Expansion into Outer 
Space (AIAA SPACE 2008 Conference and Exposition, Discussion Paper, 2008); Mike Wall, 
Next Giant Leap for Space Tourism: A Trip Around the Moon, SPACE.COM (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://www.space.com/11502-space-tourism-moon-mission-space-adventures.html. 
 51 Hearsey, supra note 50; David Harland, Mir, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www. 
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/384746/Mir. 
 52 Space Tourism Close to Reality?, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Sept. 8, 2012), http://www.upi. 
com/Top_News/US/2012/09/08/Space-tourism-close-to-reality/UPI-34541347125258/. 
 53 Patrick Manning, World’s First Spaceport Nearly Ready in New Mexico, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/science/2012/09/24/world-first-spaceport-
nearly-ready-in-new-mexico/; Space Tourism Close to Reality?, supra note 52. 
 54 Space Tourism Close to Reality?, supra note 52. 
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rights and obligations of the parties to a contract.55  The contracts may be 
between two private entities, including private individuals with the advent of 
space tourism, or between a private entity and a government agency or an 
international organization.56  But how can the rights of actors in these 
agreements dependably be safeguarded, and how can liability between the 
parties be settled?57  Many international disputes are likely to arise, 
considering the facts that (a) entities will probably be of different 
nationalities and may involve multiple states, and (b) each party is likely to 
have a great financial and scientific investment on the line.58 
Further complicating the matter, individuals and private enterprises are 
under the jurisdiction of their respective nations and domestic laws, without 
any independent legal status under current international space law dispute 
settlement mechanisms.59  Traditionally, international space law has applied 
only to sovereign states and inter-governmental organizations.60 
The need for outer space activities to operate within a unified legal 
framework is not a novel concept.61  In 1967 the United Nations adopted the 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty (OST).62  This treaty called 
upon states, and domestic entities for which those states are vicariously 
responsible, to explore outer space for peaceful purposes.63  OST also stated 
that outer space shall be the jurisdiction of all mankind.64  This essentially 
means that every state has a non-exclusive right to the peaceful use, study, 
and exploration of outer space.65  
Then, in 1972, in order to grant the OST more force and clarity under its 
article 6, the Claims Commission of the Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the Liability Convention) 
                                                                                                                   
 55 Cheng, supra note 20, at 167. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Pocar, supra note 7, at 175. 
 59 GOH, supra note 20, at 162. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Listner, supra note 2. 
 62 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Benjamin Perlman, Grounding U.S. Commercial Space 
Regulation in the Constitution, 100 GEO. L.J. 929, 932 (2012). 
 63 Outer Space Treaty, arts. 1, 6. 
 64 Id. 
 65 GOH, supra note 20, at 140. 
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entered into force.66  This treaty held states liable for any “objects” they 
launched into space.67  But the treaty failed to define what constitutes an 
object—for different purposes an object could perhaps be a satellite fragment 
or merely a paint chip.68  Moreover, the Liability Convention is only to be 
invoked when: (1) states cannot resolve the dispute diplomatically; (2) the 
dispute arises out of an activity covered in the narrow OST provisions; and 
(3) the parties invoking the convention are state actors exclusively.69  
Additionally, the states must, by specific agreement, consent to be bound by 
the Liability Convention.70  The Liability Convention only applies to states 
because international space law was originally created as an arm of public 
international law, and public international law applies only to sovereign 
states.71  The Liability Convention has never been called on to resolve a 
dispute, and the OST has only been invoked once, when a Russian satellite 
crashed in Canadian territory.72  That incident was resolved diplomatically 
with Russia agreeing to pay for the cost of cleaning up the radioactive debris 
from the crash scene.73 
Three other major international space law treaties besides the OST and 
the Liability Convention exist.  These treaties provide for the safety and 
rescue of spacecraft and astronauts, the avoidance of injurious interference 
with the space environment and behaviors, and the report and registration of 
space activities.74  But dispute resolution is not provided for in these treaties, 
and they do not apply to private actors. 
Until the Outer Space Rules were adopted, no other international dispute 
resolution mechanism specifically addressed problems that involve outer 
space activities but arise outside the narrow confines of the Liability 
                                                                                                                   
 66 Perlman, supra note 62, at 934; Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389. 
 67 Ryan Avent, Tragedy of the Space Commons, ECONOMIST (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www. 
economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/08/property_rights. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Listner, supra note 2. 
 70 Pocar, supra note 7, at 176. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Listner, supra note 2. 
 73 Avent, supra note 67. 
 74 United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE 
AFFAIRS, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaties.html (last visited Apr. 22, 
2014).  The three treaties are: The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 
7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; the Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, Nov. 12, 1974, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 
15; and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15. 
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Convention.75  Further, the other space law treaties lack guidance as to how 
to resolve complex disputes, and space-related organization instruments 
generally lack specificity in dealing with liability.76  For example, while the 
ESA’s founding convention provides for arbitration of disputes, this 
arbitration clause is narrow, as it only applies to disputes that relate to the 
ESA convention’s interpretation or application.77  Additionally, the 
International Telecommunications Union provides for arbitration within its 
documents, but this is available solely for specific subjects, like injurious 
interference to registered radio frequencies.78  Finally, while states may turn 
to traditional systems of dispute resolution available in public international 
law, such as judicial mechanisms like the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
these, again, do not apply to private parties.79  Even systems that could be 
applied to private parties, like the UNCITRAL rules for general international 
commercial arbitration, share a common problem: none of them are tailored 
to the detailed and unique disputes that arise out of conduct concerning outer 
space.80 
With private companies now conducting expeditions into outer space, 
such as SpaceX’s Dragon capsule mission,81 and viable plans for private 
firms to mine asteroids on the horizon, the applicable international law must 
be updated.82  Further, since the Outer Space Treaty defines outer space as a 
                                                                                                                   
 75 Listner, supra note 2. 
 76 Pocar, supra note 7, at 176. 
 77 Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency, art. XVII, May 30, 1975, 
14 I.L.M. 864. 
 78 Pocar, supra note 7, at 176; Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, 
Dec. 22, 1992, 1825 U.N.T.S. 31251; Final Acts of the Additional plenipotentiary Conference, 
APP-92, at 71 (1992), available at http://www.itu.int/pub/S-CONF-ACTF-1992; Optional 
Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Constitution of the 
International Telecommunication Union, to the Convention of the International 
Telecommunication Union and to the Administrative Regulations (1992), available at http:// 
www.itu.int/net/about/basic-texts/optional-protocol.aspx. 
 79 Pocar, supra note 7, at 176. 
 80 See id. at 177. 
 81 Tom Coughlin, Private Space Transportation Reaching New Heights, FORBES (July 7, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomcoughlin/2012/07/27/private-space-transportation-reachi 
ng-new-heights/.  SpaceX, located in Southern California, successfully launched and recovered 
the first private supply rocket to the ISS in May 2012, and it plans to create manned vehicles as 
an alternative to the Russian Soyuz spacecraft for human flights to the ISS.  Id. 
 82 Frans von der Dunk, as told to Veronique Greenwood, Lawyers in Space! The New Era 
of Spaceflight Needs Some New Rules, DISCOVER (June 7, 2012), http://blogs.discovermagazi 
ne.com/crux/2012/06/07/lawyers-in-space-the-new-era-of-spaceflight-needs-some-new-rules/.  
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global commons, only international law can impose limitations on the 
autonomy to operate within this realm.83 
D.  The Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Optional Rules for 
Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities 
1.  About the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
The PCA is an intergovernmental organization with 115 member states.84  
The PCA is a permanent mechanism for arbitral tribunals to resolve 
disputes.85  Founded in 1899, the PCA was created to provide forms of 
dispute resolution, particularly arbitration, between states.86  It now has 
evolved into an institution that allows states, state entities, intergovernmental 
organizations, and private parties to resolve their international legal 
disputes.87  Among the disputes resolved via the PCA are commercial and 
investment disputes—which include both bilateral and unilateral investment 
treaties—human rights disputes between states, territorial issues, and treaty 
disputes.88  
The PCA is composed of three parts: “an Administrative Council that 
oversees its policies and budgets, a panel of independent potential arbitrators 
known as the Members of the Court, and its Secretariat, known as the 
International Bureau, headed by the Secretary-General.”89  Each member 
state has the right to nominate up to four persons to the Members of the 
Court who are of “known competency in questions of international law, of 
the highest moral reputation and disposed to accept the duties of 
arbitrators.”90  The PCA may aid in the selection of arbitrators and may be 
retained to either choose or act as appointing authority.  In the last twenty 
years, the PCA has adopted eight, expert group-constructed sets of rules of 
procedure for arbitration that are “party and sector-specific.”91  In two 
                                                                                                                   
 83 Id. 
 84 About Us, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp? 
pag_id=1027. 
 85 Structure, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp? 
pag_id=1039. 
 86 About Us, supra note 84. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Structure, supra note 85. 
 90 Members of the Court – Panel of Arbitrators, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1041. 
 91 Pocar, supra note 7, at 172. 
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instances, the PCA has provided for a specialized list of arbitrators who are 
upheld as experts in a specified area.  These instances occurred with the 
creation of rules relating to resolution of environmental disputes, and for the 
Outer Space Rules.92 
2.  Advisory Group of Legal Experts 
In 2009, perceiving fundamental gaps in adequate mechanisms for the 
resolution of disputes arising from space-related activities, the 
Administrative Council of the PCA authorized the creation of an Advisory 
Group of legal experts.93  First, the Advisory Group was granted a mandate 
to gauge the demand for an absolute and binding dispute settlement forum 
regarding the utilization of outer space by private, governmental, and 
intergovernmental entities.94  In particular, the Advisory Group was to set 
forth the advantages and benefits of arbitration in this respect.95  Next, the 
mandate asked that the Advisory Group draft optional rules regarding outer 
space disputes and the resolution thereof for the PCA to include in its set of 
arbitration rules.96  The Advisory Group’s focus was on: (1) pinpointing the 
pertinent features associated with outer space activities; (2) determining 
whether, given the nature of this area, dispute resolution could be effectively 
facilitated by arbitration; and (3) determining how to revise existing 
procedural rules for arbitration to fit the unique characteristics associated 
with disputes arising from outer space activities.97  
From this analysis, the Advisory Group determined that the following 
gaps in international space law needed to be filled.  First, the Advisory 
Group determined that there was a need for a dispute resolution forum that 
would apply to state as well as non-state actors.98  Second, they resolved that 
a forum to decide all disputes related to space activities, rather than only 
those falling under certain limited provisions of narrow treaties, was 
immediately necessary.99  Third, even though private parties can resort to 
international commercial arbitration under UNCITRAL or rules under other 
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private arbitration institutions, a mechanism that specifically caters to the 
unique aspects of disputes arising from outer space activities is particularly 
worthwhile.100  Given these modern aspects of space activities, the Advisory 
Group decided that an advantageous way to accommodate these needs would 
be to establish an international arbitration forum.101 
Next, in accordance with the second prong of the mandate, the Advisory 
Group proceeded to draft the Outer Space Rules.102  In doing this, the 
Advisory Group heavily relied on the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules in addition to 
various sets of PCA procedural rules tailored for use by states, state agencies, 
and international organizations.103  The UNCITRAL Rules, adopted in 1976, 
are well-established procedural arbitration rules that parties commonly use in 
international commercial arbitration matters.104  These rules were selected as 
a model because they have stimulated more case law and academic 
scholarship than any other procedural arbitration rules mechanisms.105  Since 
the Advisory Group departed from the UNCITRAL Rules when drafting the 
Outer Space Rules only when some distinctive characteristic of disputes 
related to space activities justified a divergence, a large degree of precedent 
in interpreting and applying the UNCITRAL Rules was preserved for the 
Outer Space Rules.106  Thus, some predictability for parties using the Outer 
Space Rules was maintained. 
The first complete draft of the Outer Space Rules was sent to the PCA 
member states in May 2011 for member states to respond to the Advisory 
Committee with their in-depth commentaries on the rules.107  This enabled 
the Advisory Committee to ensure that the Outer Space Rules would 
conform to concerns expressed by states and international organizations.  
The Outer Space Rules were adopted by consensus by the Administrative 
Council of the PCA on December 6, 2011.108 
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3.  Outer Space Rules Provisions 
To start with, the Outer Space Rules are incredibly broad in scope, which 
counters the very narrow dominion possessed by previous international space 
law dispute resolution instruments.109  To illustrate the broad application of 
the Outer Space Rules, Article 1(1) sets forth that “the characterization of the 
dispute as relating to outer space is not necessary for jurisdiction.”110  This 
provision therefore preempts the possibility that the parties could be 
prevented from settling disputes because of a factual, geographic, or 
technological ambiguity as to what qualifies as related to “outer space.”111  
All that parties must do in order for these rules to apply is consent to having 
the rules apply between them.112  Further, the documents that must be 
provided in a Notice of Arbitration or a Response to the Notice of Arbitration 
may, under Articles 3(3)(d) and 4(1)(b), include a wide variety of 
instruments to which space disputes may be related, such as a “rule, decision, 
agreement, contract, convention, treaty, [or] constituent instrument of an 
organization or agency.”113  This language, while going beyond that of the 
UNCITRAL Rules, serves to advance the broadened scope of the Outer 
Space Rules by acknowledging that sources of law come from a diverse 
array of instruments.114 
The Outer Space Rules take account of the fact that states are still major 
actors in outer space activities, even with the aforementioned entry of private 
parties.  In Article 1(2), for example, the state is said to have waived 
immunity to jurisdiction when it agrees to arbitrate under these rules.115  This 
specifically dispenses with both state sovereign immunity issues and any 
intergovernmental organization jurisdictional immunity problems.116 
Another matter the Outer Space Rules tackle is that of the probable 
technical and scientific complexity involved in outer space activities.  To this 
end, the parties enjoy complete freedom to choose who will arbitrate their 
dispute, even if the person(s) chosen are not members of the PCA.117  
However, to aid and facilitate the parties’ selection, the Outer Space Rules 
mandate in Article 10(4) that the Secretary-General of the PCA compile a 
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standing list of persons with expertise in space-related matters whom parties 
may choose to use as their informed decision-makers.118  These expert 
arbitrators are nominated by the PCA member states and recommended by 
the Secretary-General, taking into account feedback from and discussions 
with the legal community in the applicable fields.119  Additionally, under 
Article 29(7) of the Outer Space Rules the arbitral tribunal may bring in 
experts to support it in the decision-making process when it decides that 
supplemental technical or scientific insight is necessary.120  The rules 
mandate that a list of scientific and technical experts be provided by the 
Secretary-General to assist the tribunal in selecting an expert for the matter at 
hand.121  However, the use of this expert list is optional, just like the use of 
the PCA’s expressly-qualified standing arbitrators list.  Moreover, the 
arbitral tribunal may call on the parties “to provide a non-technical document 
summarizing and explaining the background to any scientific, technical or 
other specialized information which the arbitral tribunal considers to be 
necessary to understand fully the matters in dispute.”122  In this manner, these 
documents can serve to help the arbitral tribunal to understand the complex 
technical issues involved in the matter and decide whether bringing in 
experts to consult would be helpful in assessing the evidence.123 
Also addressed within the Outer Space Rules is the likely need for 
heightened and expanded confidentiality in space-related disputes.  For 
example, Article 17(6) enables parties to indicate specific confidential 
information.124  The arbitral tribunal will determine if the information the 
party deems confidential is actually confidential by determining whether “the 
absence of special measures of protection in the proceedings would be likely 
to cause serious harm to the party or parties invoking its confidentiality.”125  
If this is the case, then the tribunal will direct the parties as to how to proceed 
with the confidential information and to whom to disclose it, and the tribunal 
will also require anyone to whom the confidential information is revealed to 
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sign a confidentiality undertaking.126  These protections afford advantages to 
participants.  For example, they encourage international arbitration by 
alleviating fears that a company’s competitive advantage may be lost in the 
event of a dispute.  The production of certain documents which will facilitate 
a fair and just resolution of a dispute will likely also be encouraged by these 
protections because they remove the risk to a company of its confidential 
technology and research becoming known to competitors.127 
Additionally, parties may ensure that the opposing party and the tribunal 
do not even see the confidential information.  This is accomplished through 
Article 17(8), which allows the selection and implementation of a 
“confidentiality advisor.”128  The function of this advisor is to communicate 
with the tribunal on a particular matter on the basis of confidential 
information, without disclosing the confidential material of the document to 
the tribunal or another party.129  The justifications for this confidentiality 
advisor system are two-fold.  First, the confidentiality advisor is justified 
ethically because one party may have concerns that an arbitrator chosen by 
an opposing party may be unscrupulous and would leak confidential 
information he or she acquired.130  This further encourages parties to be 
comfortable with engaging in a system of arbitration for space issues.  
Second, as a technical matter, the confidential content might be so technical 
that it would mean little to the arbitrators but would be significant to the 
advisor, who doubles as a technical expert.131  This would enable the advisor 
to assess the confidentiality of the highly technical content and be able to 
convey the relevant points to the arbitrators. 
The Outer Space Rules also streamline resolution of party challenges to 
arbitrators for parties who did not have a prior agreement on the identity of 
an appointing authority.  This is accomplished by Article 6(1), which gives 
the Secretary-General of the PCA broad appointing power.132  By this 
provision, the Secretary-General has the ability, upon a party’s request, to 
appoint, replace, and decide challenges against arbitrators.133  This is a 
different approach to the PCA Secretary-General’s role than the UNCITRAL 
Rules.  Under the UNCITRAL Rules, the Secretary-General is authorized 
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only to designate an appointing authority where the parties have agreed on 
none.134  Thus, the Outer Space Rules, by naming the PCA Secretary-General 
as the actual appointing authority, reduces the potential for delays in 
selecting the tribunal and during later challenges to the selected arbitrators.135 
Moreover, the annex of the Outer Space Rules sets forth a model 
arbitration clause, which parties may include in treaties or other agreements 
to govern the resolution of their potential contract or relationship disputes.136  
Parties can also employ this model clause to provide for the arbitration of 
present disputes.137 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  How International Arbitration, and Specifically These Outer Space Rules, 
Caters to the Unique Aspects of Space-related Disputes 
As this Note discussed in Part II.B, Outer-space activities have undergone 
significant changes between the 1950s and the modern day due to an increase 
in the number and diversity of space-related actors and the advancement of 
technology.  In light of these changes, international arbitration generally, and 
the Outer Space Rules specifically, provide many advantages for dispute 
resolution arising from space-related activities. Set forth below is a 
discussion of the benefits of international arbitration, followed by a 
discussion of the additional, specific advantages of the Outer Space Rules. 
The first benefit of international arbitration in the area of outer space-
related disputes, as discussed above, is that all parties who engage in 
activities related to space may have their disputes resolved through 
arbitration.  This includes states, intergovernmental organizations, and 
private parties alike. 
Second, arbitration is a mechanism that is based solely on the consent of 
the parties and is therefore completely voluntary.138  Pre-dispute consent may 
be given through contract, treaty, or other legal instrument or agreement.  
Alternatively, the parties may agree to arbitration after a dispute arises.  The 
optional nature of arbitration probably has the greatest appeal to states.  
States will often be more amenable to the prospect of agreeing to binding 
dispute resolution under isolated, customized agreements; rather than 
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accepting a new multilateral treaty mandating that all space-related 
grievances be handled in a specified manner, such as through the creation of 
an international court for space law or the addition of a chamber to the 
ICJ.139  The treaty-creating process is exceedingly slow, treaties are difficult 
to draft in a manner that appeals to a broad range of states with different 
interests, and treaties are difficult to change once ratified.  Parties are better 
served in efficiently achieving their goals and resolving matters quickly 
through executing individual, relationship-specific agreements providing for 
arbitration under the Outer Space Rules than in waiting around for an all-
encompassing international regime to be developed. 
Third, in contrast to the Liability Convention’s resolutions—which are 
merely recommendations—arbitration provides a binding final decision to 
the parties.140  Arbitration does not allow for appeals and may very rarely be 
challenged, and only under narrow justifications.141  Given the tight and 
exact time schedules that govern space activities—such as time windows for 
landing, atmospheric re-entry and descent, and orbital insertion—the fact that 
arbitration swiftly results in a final declaration is an important advantage to 
parties who are trying to keep to these rigid schedules.142   
Fourth, not only are arbitral awards recognized internationally, but all 149 
signatory states of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards must enforce international commercial arbitration 
awards, including major players in the space industry such as the United 
States, Russia, China, France, and the U.K.143  This is in contrast to judicial 
awards, which do not have extraterritorial effect.144 
Fifth, parties may modify the procedure for arbitration, by agreement, to 
fit their evolving and specific needs.145  This is especially advantageous in 
dealing with space activity disputes since the technology and discoveries in 
this area often advance before the law can catch up.146 
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Sixth, when arbitration is selected as the dispute resolution forum, parties 
may select their own expert decisionmakers.  This is in contrast to a court 
where cases are assigned to a judge or judges who have legal expertise but 
might lack specialized knowledge in a particular field relevant to the dispute 
at hand.147  Most space activities inherently involve both technical disciplines 
and complex social disciplines, like economics, as well as evidentiary or 
legal limitations (such as those surrounding remote sensing), which are not 
readily obvious to most adjudicators who lack proficiency in these 
specialized areas.148 
Seventh, sensitive information can remain confidential when arbitration is 
selected as the dispute resolution mechanism.  Both hearings and awards can 
be kept private, which is crucial for space-related disputes dealing with 
information pertaining to, for example, technology—transactions and 
developments that potentially straddle the thin line between civil and military 
application.149  This information may deal with national security interests, 
such as remote sensing imagery or novel technology that a party may not 
want revealed to potential competitors.150 
Finally, the PCA, owing to its intergovernmental organization status, 
extensive membership, and history of managing arbitration between states, is 
better adapted than any private institution to handle arbitrations comprising 
the broad variety of parties potentially involved in outer space-related 
activities.151 
Many advantages to specifically employing the Outer Space Rules to 
cover space-related activities exist, above and beyond the advantages of 
using some regular, non-tailored arbitral rules procedure to resolve space-
related disputes.  First, an effective mechanism to resolve disputes arising 
from space-related conduct may produce a setting that encourages 
negotiation and development of international contracts or instruments 
dealing with outer space activities.152  Without the Outer Space Rules, the 
only means of international space-related dispute resolution with state parties 
rests primarily in diplomatic schemes, with the narrow exception set forth in 
the Liability Convention.153  As is often the case when dealing with 
diplomatic resolutions, state’s unequal bargaining power may lead to a 
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diminished chance of having a dispute decided equitably.154  The Outer 
Space Rules could avoid this problem by providing an apolitical tribunal—
one already equipped with experts—for states to resolve disputes arising 
from outer space activities.155  As a result, states could be more likely to 
negotiate in treaties or smaller agreements a provision that specifies that the 
Outer Space Rules will be used to govern any disputes arising from their 
potential outer space-related disputes because they are confident that such 
issues will be resolved impartially.156  Additionally, bolstering the appeal of 
an impartial tribunal is the fact that states (and any other parties) still retain 
significant input in the arbitration, such as through selecting the arbitrators, 
which allows states to feel protected from the risk of a biased tribunal. 
Second, states are not the only parties who benefit in this way from the 
enactment of the Outer Space Rules.  Private entities also receive assurance 
of impartial dispute resolution by subjecting international space-related 
contracts, such as those for satellite launches and operations, to arbitration 
under the outer space rules.157 
Third, the problem of space debris, an issue which has dramatically 
increased in importance since the start of the space age and constitutes a key 
focus for many disputes, may be solved more readily with the advent of the 
Outer Space Rules.158  These rules may help hold parties accountable and 
determine liability in such instances, motivating parties to limit debris 
creation.  Although space debris lacks a uniform international definition, it is 
usually defined as at least all man-made objects in orbit about the Earth, 
which no longer serve a useful function.  Space debris largely comes from 
defective satellites, old rocket bodies, and the shrapnel resulting from the 
collision of these bodies.159  As early as 1981 space debris began to be 
recognized, though at that time the count was estimated at merely 5,000 
objects.160  More than 20,000 orbital debris pieces at least as large as a 
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softball cloud around the Earth today, and space-faring states and entities 
must operate a surveillance network tracking all of these objects in order to 
prevent collisions.161  Even a small piece of debris traveling at speeds of up 
to 7.8 kilometers per second can destroy or disable a satellite if the two 
objects collide.162  The dangers associated with space debris are illustrated 
through the important military, intelligence, civilian, scientific, and 
environmental uses of outer space.163  For example, satellites perform a 
variety of functions, such as carrying out military operations with precision-
guided weapons, conducting surveillance of suspected atomic weapons 
development, increasing internet connectivity, assessing changes in sea level 
or arctic ice density, and forecasting hurricane trajectories.164  Space 
technology has also increasingly been used to deliver medical information 
and aid to remote, rural areas so that a wider range of people across the 
world have access to medical information and diagnosis.165  The increase in 
space debris is likely to obstruct these uses of outer space and make it 
difficult for satellites to operate without being destroyed, along with the 
investments that went into creating them.  This problem has the potential to 
chill space investment, creating an imperative for the Outer Space Rules to 
effectively deal with this issue. 
The Outer Space Rules may aid in holding parties accountable for their 
debris and in assessing conduct in outer space.  Under the Liability 
Convention, every piece of space junk is still the responsibility of the nation 
that launched it (or the nation in which the company that launched it resides), 
and, as such, states are liable on a fault basis for any damage the debris 
inflicts on other objects in orbit.166  In 2011, the ISS alone was involved in at 
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least four near-collision incidents.167  These incidents raise many questions 
about the application of a fault standard of liability in ways that were not yet 
implicated during the start of the space age.  How can fault be determined in 
outer space?  How does fault apply to non-state actors?  How does a party 
know what nation or entity a piece of debris belongs to?  If a piece of space 
debris collides with international property, such as the ISS, who is liable and 
to whom?  These areas are where the Outer Space Rules could help interpret 
and fortify the Liability Convention principles, while taking account of 
modern realities by determining appropriate measures of fault and relief, 
given the diverse parties, circumstances, technology, and any existing 
contracts or treaties at play in the incident.  Additionally, as mentioned 
above, under the Outer Space Rules system, both liability and recovery may 
be apportioned to non-state as well as state actors in regards to their space 
activities.   
Fourth, and related to space debris, is the issue that no legal provisions 
exist for when an object is effectively “abandoned” in space.  This is in 
contrast with the law of the high seas, where rules are in place so that an 
entity can salvage debris or remove it without breaching ownership rights.168  
So even though a space object, like a satellite or a fragment of a rocket, may 
no longer be functioning, it is not assumed to be abandoned by the nation 
that launched it, and therefore it may not be interfered with absent consent 
from the launching nation.169  Removing defunct satellites could involve the 
use of processes that physically remove the space object to a different orbit 
out of the way of active orbiting objects, or to an unstable orbit that would 
guarantee the quick destruction of the object.170  This type of removal would 
require an in-depth knowledge of the spacecraft and object so that the 
removal effort would not create additional fragmentation and debris.171  It 
follows that this type of process would likely entail the disclosure of 
technical details about the space object.  Therefore, the negotiation of 
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licensing, confidentiality, and nondisclosure agreements between the owners 
and the salvagers of the derelict satellites or objects would have to take place 
to protect the intellectual property rights of the owners.172  The Outer Space 
Rules may be useful in this situation for two reasons.  Firstly, they provide a 
model clause to include in party contracts that involve outer space activities, 
which can aid parties in negotiations and in drafting contracts to better 
anticipate liability allocation and substantive law application.  Secondly, the 
parties will probably be willing to provide for any dispute that may arise to 
be arbitrated through the Outer Space Rules because their confidential 
information will remain protected and the dispute will be adjudicated before 
a group of experts in the area.   
Fifth, as this Note described in Part II.D.3, specialty arbitral safeguards, 
beyond those standard in most arbitral systems, are provided for in the Outer 
Space Rules.  For example, the rules provide for the appointment of a 
confidentiality advisor in appropriate circumstances, providing heightened 
protections on party information.  Additionally, the PCA’s lists of space-
related specialists who can serve as experts and arbitrators help parties secure 
the most competent tribunal and arbitration process possible to resolve their 
especially complex disputes.  Having pre-determined lists of such qualified 
individuals also promotes efficiency and timeliness in the arbitral process. 
Finally, the international community is working to develop an optional 
Code of Conduct for outer space activities.173  The Outer Space Rules may be 
used to augment this code or other similar best practice guides.  For example, 
parties may agree to follow this new code in a contract and also provide for 
arbitration under the Outer Space Rules.  In such instances the arbitration 
panel can consider the code requirements in assessing a binding dispute 
resolution.  
B.  Potential Drawbacks to the Outer Space Rules and Why These Rules are 
Still the Best Available Option in Spite of These Possible Drawbacks 
Concerns, however, exist over the effectiveness of the Outer Space Rules.  
For example, the rules may only be implemented if parties expressly consent 
to be bound by them, which could render the Outer Space Rules ineffective 
and inconsistent if all or most parties do not consent to have their disputes 
governed in this fashion.  While this concern could ring true if parties do not 
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embrace this dispute resolution mechanism, the benefits, flexibility, and 
security they offer to all outer space activity actors make widespread 
rejection unlikely.  In dealing with activities related to outer space, the 
stakes—temporal, monetary, security, informational, reputational, 
environmental—are too high to risk not having a tailored dispute resolution 
forum and procedure that will produce an informed, confidential, and 
internationally enforceable result.  The Outer Space Rules meet all of those 
needs. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Outer Space Rules developed in response to the void in outer space 
law.  Other processes of resolving disputes related to outer space activities, 
such as the Liability Convention, are exceptionally narrow in scope and 
application.  While the Liability Convention may have sufficed to regulate 
outer space activities in the 1970s, when the only actors involved in space 
activities were states (or governmental organizations), the activities and 
players in outer space have dramatically changed and are continuing to 
evolve.  Given the high demand for dispute resolution that will likely arise as 
these changes proceed and develop, arbitration under the Outer Space Rules 
provides the most effective and capable forum to address these issues.   
For one, the Outer Space Rules are available to a wide range of public 
and private parties including states, international organizations, corporations, 
and individuals.  Additionally, while this forum is available to all sorts of 
parties, it is voluntary and rests on the consent of the parties to elect to have 
their dispute governed by the Outer Space Rules.  This quality is attractive to 
states because they are far more likely to feel comfortable entering into 
discreet agreements that provide for the use of the Outer Space Rules to 
resolve disputes, rather than signing a sweeping multilateral treaty that 
provides that in all instances that ever arise, the state will be bound by one 
particular mechanism and will have to treat each dispute in the same manner.   
Also of import is the fact that arbitration can be kept private to safeguard 
the confidentiality of the parties, and the Outer Space Rules provide for a 
confidentiality advisor so that confidential information is even protected 
from the adverse party and arbitrators.  This is advantageous in multiple 
regards.  It caters to the unique qualities of outer space activities, which tend 
to involve highly technical devices with large amounts of money at stake, by 
allowing for the preservation of confidential information from potential 
competitors in the market.  The Outer Space Rules also provide a trustworthy 
forum to augment potential international rules and standards of best practice 
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for the use of outer space, since the rules allow arbitrators, when resolving 
disputes, to measure party conduct against the standards set forth in party 
agreements.  Such augmentation must be developed in light of all of the 
changes that have occurred over the last sixty years.   
Given the vital role outer space plays in modern life and its variety of 
uses, a specific dispute-resolution mechanism catering to its unique features 
is important.  The Outer Space Rules are the best mechanism to rise to this 
challenge and safeguard all party interests. 
